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Abstract 
This study examines the relationship between Japan’s financial structure and the country’s 
fiscal/monetary policy. Vector Error Correction models are utilized to investigate the effect of 
policy shocks on financial structure development during a sample period of 48 years. Our 
findings reveal signs of an existing long-run relationship between policy variables and financial 
structure. Policymakers in Japan may have effectively influenced Japan’s financial structure 
development via fiscal and monetary actions. This result strengthens the assumption of a volatile 
financial structure due to policy interference. This study is the first of its kind and is intended to 
stimulate further research and debate. 
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1. Introduction 
 For many decades the active debate on whether the financial structure of a country affects 
economic growth has lead to a vast number of articles (Dolar and Meh (2002) provide an 
excellent literature survey) and two very contrary points of view. One group of economists argue 
that financial structure does not affect economic growth, while the second group of economists 
claims that it does. Mainly World Bank affiliated scholars (e.g. Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 
(2001), Levine (2002) ) suggest an irrelevant relationship between economic growth and 
financial structure while, for instance, Arestis et al. (2001), Arestis et al. (2005), Ergungor 
(2003), Luintel et al. (2008), Hoshi et al. (1991); Mork and Nakkamura (1999), Weinstein and 
Yafeh (1998); present opposing results. In this regard, both sides have been presenting 
competing empirical results, based on econometric analysis, in order to support their standpoint. 
This controversial debate deals with an extremely important economic issue because, as Arestis 
et al. (2005, p.1) point out, “[…] resolving this issue undoubtedly improves the quality of 
economic policies”.  
 According to Dolar and Meh (2002), financial structure can be defined as the extent to 
which the financial system in a country is either market or bank-based. In the context of the 
ongoing debate, the aim of this present empirical work is to assess whether induced fiscal and 
monetary policies do indeed affect the degree of market and bank-orientation within a country’s 
financial system.   
Interestingly, the question of whether the financial structure of a country may be 
influenced by imposed fiscal or monetary policies has not been considered so far. Nevertheless, 
this question breaks new ground, since, if the financial structure is affected by any such policies, 
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the assumption of an independent and thus stable financial structure development would be 
invalid. Hence, any examination of a possible linkage between economic growth and the 
financial structure of a country may be misleading, since imposed policy actions would alter the 
financial structure and thus also affect its impact on economic growth. 
 This study examines the effect of fiscal and monetary shocks on the financial structure of 
Japan by means of an unrestricted Vector Autoregression (VAR) model over the period 1960-
2008 which, due to cointegrated variables, is expanded to a Vector Error Correction (VEC) 
model. For this purpose, annual time series data for Japan has been collected from three sources, 
namely the IMF’s online data base, the Tokyo Stock Exchange’s website and the World Bank’s 
Financial Structure Database (revised November 2010, available via the World Bank’s 
website; see also Beck et al. (2000)). The benefit of our econometric model is firstly the 
possibility to account for multi-directional interrelationships between our variables (invalidating 
the issue of data endogeneity), while we are able to observe both the short-run and long-run 
interactions. Although Japan’s economy has suffered a massive downturn since the 1990s, 
tragically amplified by the devastating earthquake in 2011, its case represents a very interesting 
and important example of an open economy contending with monetary and fiscal actions at 
restoring its growth.  
 This paper contributes to the existing empirical literature by presenting findings which 
reveal evidence of a long-run relationship between implemented fiscal and monetary policies and 
financial structure in Japan. Although the impact of policy shocks is rather weak and ultimately 
insignificant, our findings do not support the assumption of a policy-independent development of 
Japan’s financial structure during the past few decades. To the best of our knowledge, this is the 
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first study to estimate the long-run relationship between fiscal and monetary policy, respectively, 
and financial structure. Our objective is to stimulate a new and fruitful debate on the sensitivity 
of financial system developments to policy shocks. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section below, we 
discuss several (empirical and theoretical) findings by other scholars who have analyzed the 
effect of either policy on the market and bank-sector. This approach will enable us to formulate 
assumptions which can subsequently be compared with our own empirical findings. After 
specifying our model and data in Section 3, the empirical results, accompanied by the relevant 
test diagnostics of our models, are presented in Section 4. A discussion of our findings and 
conclusions can be found in Section 5 and 6, respectively.  
2. Related Literature 
 The effect of fiscal and monetary policy on the stock market and banking sector, 
respectively, has been examined (mostly separately) in various empirical studies so far. Since the 
stock market and banking sector are major elements of any financial system, the relative level of 
bank or capital market orientation is examined through financial-structure indices which are 
computed in section three of this study. Relevant empirical findings are reported in this section in 
order to identify possible explanations for our empirical findings. Nevertheless, to the best of our 
knowledge, an examination of policy impacts on the relative relationship between the capital 
market and bank sector has not so far been conducted.  
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Policy impacts on the stock market 
 Since the late 1960s, economists like Tobin (1969) and Barro (1974), followed by many 
others, have introduced theoretical assumptions on the reaction of stock markets to shocks 
induced by monetary and fiscal actions. Laopodis (2009) points out that, while Tobin (1969) 
assumes a significant impact of both policies on stock markets, Barro’s (1974) theory of debt-
neutrality, also known as the Ricardian Equivalence proposition, states that current fiscal actions 
should not affect current stock returns. As noted by Laopodis (2009) there is an extensive 
empirical literature on monetary policy impacts on the US stock market. In fact, this statement 
appears to apply to most developed countries. Leelahapan (2009) detects strong and persistent 
monetary policy effects on Asian stock markets, specifically for Thailand, Malaysia and South 
Korea. Ioannidis and Kontonikas (2006) analyze thirteen OECD countries and report (also for 
Japan) a significant and negative relationship between monetary tightening and real expected 
stock returns. Pennings et al. (2011) provide empirical evidence of a negative impact of tight 
money on stock markets for a sample of eight small open economies, including larger OECD 
countries like Canada and the UK. Similar to Pennings et al. (2011), Amador et al. (2011) detect 
an increase in stock market liquidity due to expansionary monetary policy for the cases of 
Germany, France and Italy. It is evident that there are more or less interrelated, theoretical 
models of money and stock prices with the aim of predicting the impact of monetary shocks on 
stock markets. Sellin (1998) presents four basic models which offer more or less different 
predictions, as seen in Table 1. Notably, all models predict a negative relationship between 
monetary shocks and stock returns.  
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When examining the effects of fiscal policy shock effects on stock markets, it becomes 
more difficult to find relevant studies conducted in recent years. Fortunately, Laopodis (2009) 
provides a current analysis of fiscal effects on US stock markets. His findings support the 
assumption of a negative relationship between budget deficits and stock market returns. This 
finding indeed contradicts Barro’s (1974) Ricardian Equivalence assumption. Afonso and Sousa 
(2009) also observe a negative effect of government spending on stock prices in Germany, U.K. 
and the U.S. 
Policy impacts on the banking sector 
Regrettably, the number of empirical studies on the effect of monetary and fiscal policy 
on the banking sector activity, specifically the supply of loans to the private sector, is very 
limited. Hence, few reports of previously detected effects are available. Igan and Aydin (2010) 
conduct their empirical analysis on the impact of policy innovations on the Turkish loanable 
funds market. Their analysis reveals a twofold effect of monetary policy. On the one hand, the 
supply of foreign credit appears to be insensitive to monetary policy shocks, while on the other 
hand, a significant effect on domestic credits is reported. Furthermore, while short-term domestic 
loans increase as monetary policy tightens, long-term loans decrease. With regard to fiscal policy 
effects, Igan and Aydin (2010) observe a negative influence on the supply of short-term loans. 
The long-term loan supply is revealed to be unaffected by fiscal policy. Blank and Dovern 
(2009) examine the distress probability of German banks caused by policy innovations. They 
conclude that monetary shocks have the highest distress impact, while fiscal actions also yield a 
negative effect. Nevertheless, their findings provide no insight into the credit market, although 
any distress may be caused by negative effects on the credit market. 
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As may be apparent so far, it is very difficult to formulate hypotheses on the potential 
results of our analysis. Furthermore, expectations based on theoretical models and propositions 
appear to be too vague, given the fact that empirical studies tend to be ambiguous in their overall 
findings. Therefore, since our aim is to observe whether financial structure is affected by fiscal 
and monetary innovations, we utilize both empirical and theoretical perspectives to evaluate our 
findings, which are presented in the following section. 
3. Model and Data 
 In order to assess the financial structure of specific countries, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 
(1999) and Levine (2002) were among the first to introduce three major indices which they 
utilize to create an overall financial structure index. For our analysis, we compute these widely 
accepted indices for our examination. An explanation of these indices and their calculation is 
presented in this section. For interested readers, Levine (2002) provides a very detailed 
explanation. 
We have chosen Japan for our empirical analysis due to following reasons: 
1) Data availability; the most complete data was available for Japan’s case via the named 
sources over the longest sample period. 
2) Japan represents a G8 country with one of the largest open economies worldwide. 
3) Japan’s banking and capital markets are among the largest and best capitalized markets 
worldwide, due to one of the world’s highest saving rates. 
Three key measures of the financial structure are computed: Structure-Activity, Structure-
Size, and Structure-Efficiency. Notably, since Overhead Cost data is not available over the entire 
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sample period, we use the Bank Credit to Bank Deposit ratio as a substitute. When observing the 
Structure-Activity, we calculate the Total Equity Value Traded ratio to GDP, divided by the Bank 
Credit ratio to GDP.
 
 For all measures, we use real GDP with the base year 2000. It is well 
known that, after taking the log of this index, a bank-dominated financial system yields negative 
values. The more negative the index value, the more the bank sector dominates the market, while 
a positive value reflects higher market activity. Therefore, this measure helps us to identify 
whether the banking sector dominates the market sector or vice versa. In a perfectly balanced 
situation, the indicator would equal zero or log of one, respectively. However, the closer to zero 
the index value, the more balanced the financial system in terms of bank and market 
concentration. In order to compute the Structure-Size index, we use the fraction of Market 
Capitalization ratio to GDP and the Bank Credit ratio to GDP. Bank Credit reflects the value of 
Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks. This indicator reflects the size of stock markets relative 
to that of banks. Larger values indicate a more market-based financial system, while lower 
values reveal the converse. If its log-value is zero, both markets are equal in size and thus 
balanced. Negative index values indicate a bank-based, rather than a market-based system and 
vice versa.  
We measure Structure-Efficiency by computing the efficiency of stock markets relative to 
that of banks. We thus multiply the ratio of total value of equities traded (hereafter, TVT) to 
GDP by the ratio of bank credit to bank deposit (hereafter, BB). The larger the log-value of this 
index, the more efficient markets are relative to banks. According to Levine (2002), negative 
scores are the result of relatively higher bank efficiency and for this reason, a sign of bank 
dominance. In a market-based financial system, the positive index value is higher, the more 
dominant the market. Note that Japan is widely considered as a developed, high-income country 
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with a historically bank-based financial system (see Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (1999) and 
Levine (2002)). All three (log-form) indices are presented in Figure 1 below and indicate that 
there have been changes towards a less bank-based financial system over the total time period 
examined.  
In addition to the three measures computed, we gather data reflecting monetary and fiscal 
policy impacts, measured through real narrow money (RM1) and real fiscal spending to GDP 
ratio (G), respectively. Table 2 provides a summary of variable acronyms employed in our 
econometric model. 
 We set up three VAR models by incorporating each structure index as a dependent 
variable on the left side of our equation, while the measures RM1 and G are chosen as our 
endogenous right-hand-side variables, with the constant term being the only exogenous 
component. A VAR model can generally be described via the following mathematical 
representation:
3
 
ttptptt BxyAyAy ε++++= −− ...11  
“where yt is a k vector of endogenous variables, xt is a d vector of exogenous variables,  
A1, …, AP and B are matrices of coefficients to be estimated, and εt is a vector of innovations that 
may be contemporaneously correlated, but are uncorrelated with their own lagged values and 
uncorrelated with all of the right-hand side variables.” For our case, we utilize an unrestricted 
VAR model with lag length 3 for SA and SS, respectively. For SE our model is estimated with 6 
lags. We choose all lag lengths as suggested by the Akaike Criterion. The advantage of a VAR is 
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that all variables are treated as jointly endogenous and no restriction is imposed on their 
structural relationship. The three calculated VAR models have following general form, e.g. for 
the case of two-year lags: 
tttttttt cGbRMbSbGaRMaSaS 111213212211113112111 11 ε+++++++= −−−−−−  
tttttttt cGbRMbSbGaRMaSaRM 212223222221123122121 111 ε+++++++= −−−−−−  
tttttttt cGbRMbSbGaRMaSaG 313233232231133132131 11 ε+++++++= −−−−−−  
St represents the analyzed structure index SA, SS, and SE, respectively. The error term is 
represented via εij assuming ),0(..~
2
iit dii εσε  with zero covariance of all error terms. The 
parameters to be estimated are aij, bij, and ci. The latter represents the only exogenous variable, 
namely the constant term. Parameter aij measures the previous year impact of our structure index, 
real money supply and government spending, respectively. Our second parameter bij also 
measures the impact of all variables (with two-year lags) on our left side variable. Any 
significant value of a variable induces a long-term effect on the left side variable.  
Since we find evidence of cointegration among all variables, we can expand the VAR 
model to a VEC model, which not only accounts for the long-run relationship of all variables, but 
also incorporates the short-run adjustment parameters. For a theoretical description of a VEC 
model, see for instance Gujarati (2004). 
The following section reports our analysis procedure and findings. 
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4. Findings 
First, we test whether the variables are stationary, employing the Elliott-Rothenberg-
Stock DF-GLS and Phillips-Perron (PP) unit-root tests, assuming an intercept only or an 
intercept and linear trend in our variables. Note that the DF-GLS test result may not be reliable if 
the sample size is below 50. Given our limited sample size of 50 observations, the DF-GLS test 
results are treated with caution. On the other hand, an alternative unit-root test like the KPSS test 
is not reliable either as Jönsson (2011) demonstrates that it also suffers from size distortion when 
facing small or medium sample sizes. Hence, the PP unit root test is conducted supplementary to 
the DF-GLS test, shown in Table 3. We stick with the PP test results whenever DF-GLS results 
are different to what the PP test suggests. With regard to the test results for SA, we decide to 
stick with the PP test results for the intercept-only case since this variable seems not to be 
trending over the sample period. 
Since we can assume that our variables are all integrated of order one (I(1)), the next step 
in the analysis is to determine whether all variables are cointegrated. If this is the case, we can 
compute a VEC model, which represents a VAR model, including a cointegration term which is 
also known as the error correction term. At the same time, the VEC model allows for short-run 
adjustment parameters in our equation. Our VEC model can be written in following (one-year 
lag) matrix form: 
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The short-run adjustment parameters are denoted by αij and measure the speed of adjustment 
towards the long-run equilibrium in case of a deviation. The error correction relationship is 
represented by the product of the β-matrix ( ijβ coefficients show the long-run equilibrium 
relationships between levels of variables) and the vector of lagged endogenous variables. For the 
case of SA and SS we chose a VEC lag length of two while SE is estimated with 5 lags. Short-run 
changes in the variables are denoted by γij coefficients. The last two vectors represent the 
constant and error terms, respectively.  
In accordance to the common procedure to estimate a VEC model, at first we estimate the 
cointegration vectors. Before doing so we have to check whether cointegration relations among 
our variables exist. Therefore, the Johansen cointegration test is performed by employing the 
Trace and Eigenvalue Statistics, respectively, after the optimal VAR lag length is determined by 
utilizing the Akaike Criterion. Our test results, presented in Table 4, indicate that there is at least 
one cointegrated vector r. Considering cointegration test results, we can progress to compute the 
VEC model for each structure index. For the case of the relation between SA, RM1 and G, our 
VEC model is: 
ttttttttttt εc∆Gγ∆Gγ∆RMγ∆RMγ∆Sγ∆Sγ)GβRMβS(βα∆S 11121611521411321211111311211111 111 ++++++++++= −−−−−−−−−   
ttttttttttt εc∆Gγ∆Gγ∆RMγ∆RMγ∆Sγ∆Sγ)GβRMβS(βα∆RM 22122612522412321212111311211121 1111 ++++++++++= −−−−−−−−−  
ttttttttttt εc∆Gγ∆Gγ∆RMγ∆RMγ∆Sγ∆Sγ)GβRMβS(βα∆G 33123613523413323213111311211131 111 ++++++++++= −−−−−−−−−  
For the case of SS, RM1and G, the representation is similar while our third VEC model is 
estimated with four lags. Table 5 reports (normalized) cointegration vector estimates while 
adjustment coefficients for each model are presented in Table 6.  
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From Table 5, our monetary policy parameters are seen to have consistent signs and be 
highly significant at no less than the 5 percent level. Apparently, the standard error for G in all 
three equations is much higher than for the other variables. Nevertheless, we observe a highly 
significant effect on SE. The time trend parameter is also highly significant, indicating that over 
time, ceteris paribus, Japan’s financial system tends to become more bank-dominated, especially 
with regard to activity and size. 
A one percent increase in the real money supply causes an increase in activity, size and 
efficiency of the financial system by about 2, 1, and 0.3 percent respectively, ceteris paribus. 
Furthermore, the effect of fiscal policy on SE is almost 16 percent increase, per one percent 
increase in fiscal consumption, ceteris paribus. We cannot identify any significant fiscal effect 
on other indices. Now that the long-run effects have been observed, the short-run adjustment 
parameters are examined. 
With regards to our estimation results in Table 6, it is evident that not all adjustment 
parameters are significant. Clearly, only government expenditure exerts an overall significant 
short-run adjustment effect which, however, entails a very slow speed of adjustment. The money 
supply yields a higher speed of adjustment, although with no significant effect for the case of SE. 
Overall, the short-run relationship between policy parameters and structure indices appears to be 
very weak.  
The adjustment parameters contain weights A, with which an estimated cointegration 
vector enters the short-run dynamics. With regard to our results, an overall slow speed of short-
run adjustment, if significant, can be observed for each vector. In order to check for weak 
exogeneity among our variables, we impose zero conditions on these coefficients, demonstrated 
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in Table 7. The null assumes weak exogeneity. With regards to the joint zero restriction results, 
in the last row of Table 7, we can reject the null at the one percent level. Hence, one can 
conclude that our right-hand-side variables, with respect to each index), are (jointly) not 
exogenous in the weak form. 
In order to obtain a clearer picture of the impact of policy shocks, Generalized Impulse 
Responses (which do not rely on the VAR ordering) for all three models are estimated and 
presented in Figures 2, 3, and 4. It may be noted that Generalized Impulse Responses and 
Variance Decomposition graphs show the system-wide impact of shocks on a given variable. 
Variance decomposition graphs and tables are available upon request from the authors. They 
confirm the results from the Impulse Response functions. The impulse responses observed for SA 
indicate a long-lasting and positive effect (more than a decade) of monetary and fiscal 
innovations. Nevertheless, the impact of both policy measures on financial system activity is 
quite small. For SS, a similar picture emerges, with a small and positive, but long-lasting effect 
of both policies being apparent. In both cases, none policy effect dies out at all. Interestingly, for 
SE, the impact of fiscal shocks appears to be insignificant, whereas the monetary policy shocks 
once again yield a positive and long-lasting effect, although with a low response. Both effects die 
out after a decade. With regard to the composition of our indices, a positive impact on any index 
implies a movement towards a more market-oriented financial system. Overall, as the Impulse 
Response figures (which come without confidence bands), we find empirical evidence of a small, 
but significant long-run policy impact, fiscal and monetary, on Japan’s financial system during 
the examined period. 
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In order to confirm the stability of the estimated models and reliability of our findings, 
the following diagnostic checks are conducted.  
Autoregressive Roots Table 
If the estimated VEC model is stationary, as assumed, the number of inverse roots of the 
underlying autoregressive polynomial, which are equal to unity, must equal two for each model. 
Our test results, presented in Table 8, confirm that all three models yield two unit roots. Hence, 
this stability condition is fulfilled by all equations. 
Autocorrelation  
A key assumption for a stable ordinary least squares estimation, as described by Gujarati 
(2004), which is used for computing our VEC model parameters, is that there is no 
autocorrelation among the residuals. To test for the validity of this assumption, we employ both 
the Portmanteau and LM autocorrelation tests. None of the models reveal relevant signs of 
autocorrelation as presented in Tables 9 and 10.  
Zero mean value of disturbances 
The validity of this assumption for all models is checked via a normality test for the 
model residuals. With regard to the small sample size, the Inverse Square Root of Residual 
Covariance Matrix-test proposed by Lütkepohl (1991) is chosen and confirms a normal 
distribution of the error terms. Table 11 lists our test results. 
Equal variance of disturbances, homoescedasticity 
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The stability of our VEC models with regard to equal error term variance distribution can also be 
confirmed through an extended White-test, results are listed in Table 12. 
 
5. Discussion 
 As observed, Japan’s financial system has been more or less affected by the policies 
applied. The long-run relationship between the financial structure indices and policy variables 
are not really surprising, since these indices are most likely (at least indirectly) affected by the 
imposed fiscal and monetary policies. Market Capitalization and Bank Credit Ratio are measures 
certainly affected by shocks in terms of narrow money. Hence, the fact that monetary policy 
reveals a more lasting impact on all three measures appears to be justified. Interestingly, this 
impulse yields an increasing effect after a few years. On the other hand, fiscal policy, measured 
through fiscal spending, does not yield this kind of overall effect, and for SE’s case the shock 
imposed dies out over the years. Nevertheless, this time span can take more than 10 years, as in 
the case of SA and SS, respectively. The high fiscal impact on SE implies that stock markets 
strongly benefit from increasing fiscal consumption, probably due to an increase in TVT. The 
overall effect on the bank sector is ambiguous. However, even if the effect is positive, it does not 
exceed the positive effect on the market.  
Interestingly, as shown in Figure 5, real narrow money volume has exceeded fiscal 
spending since 1984, with massive differences in the amount. With respect to this observation, 
the overall influence of fiscal policy, relatively considered, has been higher than that of its 
counterpart. Indeed, Guerrero and Parker (2010) observe a positive impact of government 
spending on real economic growth in Japan. If we assume a positive impact of financial structure 
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on economic growth, as promoted by Arestis et al. (2005), the identified relationship between 
fiscal policy and financial structure appears to be reasonable. Furthermore, a positive impact of 
fiscal actions on the development of a country’s financial structure is not surprising. Overall, 
Japan’s financial system has been moving towards a less bank-based system, as also observed by 
Capelle-Blancard et al. (2008). They also point out that the reason for this finding may be the 
impressive development of Tokyo’s financial market, making the city to one of the leading 
financial centers worldwide. 
6. Conclusion 
 When referring to the previous theoretical and empirical findings presented in Section 2, 
a positive effect of expansionary monetary policy on financial structure is not surprising, since 
low interest rates support a higher demand for equities. Furthermore, falling interest rates also 
support a higher credit demand, while the credit supply decreases at the same time. Hence, the 
relative advantage for the stock market appears to be justified. Our empirical findings introduced 
in Section 2 also suggest a negative impact of fiscal spending on stock markets, Japan’s case 
(partly) confirms this assumption, since fiscal spending creates a decrease in the financial 
system’s stock market efficiency. Apparently, monetary innovations yield a positive impact on 
stock market dominance but it is not clear whether there is a generally negative impact on the 
banking sector. Furthermore, it is more appropriate to interpret our results as supporting for the 
assumption of a positive effect on relative market dominance.  
Our study fills a gap in the literature which so far has not analyzed the effect of monetary 
and fiscal policy on financial structure. Nonetheless, our findings do not deliver proof of a strong 
impact of any of these policies on the development of Japan’s financial structure, although there 
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has been a very volatile development towards a less bank-dominated financial system, as shown 
in Figure 1. Nevertheless, the existence of a long-run relationship appears to be very likely. For 
Japan’s case, this relationship appears to be rather weak, but this may not be the case for other, 
and especially less financially developed countries. Therefore, if one assumes that there is 
generally a significant policy impact on financial structure development, this would imply that 
fiscal and monetary decision makers can influence the development of a country’s financial 
structure (indirectly). In fact, the initial observations show that in some countries financial 
structure has been changing back and forth, while others reveal a less volatile development. 
For the case of Singapore, Figure 6 shows how volatile this development has been through the 
period 1992 until 2009. Over the same period, the United States reveals a more stable 
development towards a capital market-dominated financial system, demonstrated in Figure 7. 
Unsurprisingly, since 2001, a significant downturn in market dominance is evident. Hence, it 
seems clear that during politically difficult times, capital markets have been suffering to the 
advantage of their rival sector. 
This volatile image (as in Figure 6) may be a reflection of active financial markets and banking 
sectors and thus a perfect image of a competitive and global market. But what if this is not the 
case? Perhaps we should rather ask ourselves whether these widely accepted financial system 
measures are sufficiently reliable, if they do not account for the influence of policy makers, in 
the sense that they are biased towards other influences, rather than those of the market itself. If 
we assume a positive impact of financial structure on economic growth, this could also imply 
collinearity, since market capitalization, TVT and BB are most likely influenced by economic 
growth. Indeed, Beck et al. (2001) discuss the complexity of quantifying financial structure 
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through appropriate indices, and Capelle-Blancard et al. (2008) highlight this issue by referring 
to Japan. They point out that quantifying Japan’s financial system as bank dominated, appears 
controversial with regard to the internationally leading role of Japan’s capital market. 
This study does not claim to be perfect and its main aim is to stimulate further research 
and discussion of the presented findings at an international level. Shortcomings should be noted 
with respect to the limited sample size, since it was difficult to calculate more indices, due to the 
lack of data. We strongly recommend observations for longer sample periods and for other 
countries. Alternative monetary policy measures, such as inter-bank interest rates, can and 
should be utilized where appropriate. 
Our reported findings suggest the need for a further and more detailed examination of the 
observed relationships. We hope that an intensive and open debate among scholars and policy 
makers worldwide will ensue. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Theoretical Monetary Policy and Stock Return models, based on Sellin (1998)* 
Name First developments by Overall prediction 
Utility Function Models LeRoy (1984), Danthine and 
Donaldson (1986), Stulz (1986), Boyle 
(1990), Bakshi and Chen (1996) 
• Monetary shocks will 
have a negative impact 
on stock returns, unless 
monetary policy is 
procyclical, in the sense 
that the covariance 
between output growth 
and money supply 
exceeds the variance in 
output growth. 
Cash in Advance Models Lucas (1982 & 1984), Day (1984), 
Svensson (1985), Lucas and Stokey 
(1987), Labadie (1989), Giovanni and 
Labadie (1991), Boyle and Peterson 
(1995) 
• If monetary policy is 
strongly procyclical, a 
positive relationship 
exists. 
• If monetary policy is 
weakly procyclical or 
countercyclical, a 
negative relationship 
exists. 
Transaction Cost Models Marshall (1992) • Negative relationship 
between monetary policy 
and stock returns. 
 
Structural Macroeconomic Models Feldstein (1980), Lachler (1983, 
Groenewold et al. (1997) 
• Negative relationship 
between monetary policy 
and stock returns. 
* References can be found in Sellin (1998) 
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Table 2: Variable Acronyms 
Variable Definition 
RM1 Real M1 Monetary Aggregate (log-form) 
G Real Government Expenditure divided by real GDP 
SA Structure-Activity  (= Total Value Traded/Bank Credit) 
SS Structure-Size (= Market Capitalization/Bank Credit) 
SE Structure-Efficiency (= Total Value Traded * Bank Credit to Bank Deposit ratio) 
 
Table 3: Unit-root test results at 5% significance level 
   Intercept Intercept & Trend 
   DF-GLS PP DF-GLS PP 
SA 
Level 
Test Statistics -2.733067 -1.866644 -3.383508 -2.412848 
Critical Value -1.947816 -2.922449 -3.190000 -3.504330 
     
First Difference 
Test Statistics -2.934743 -3.065049 -3.094390 -2.895435 
Critical Value -1.947816 -2.923780 -3.190000 -3.506374 
     
   DF-GLS PP DF-GLS PP 
SS 
Level 
Test Statistics -1.862170 -2.016746 -2.268726 -2.678726 
Critical Value -1.947816 -2.922449 -3.190000 -3.504330 
     
First Difference 
Test Statistics 
Critical Value 
-5.976922 
-1.947816 
-6.124176 
-2.923780 
-5.925417 
-3.190000 
-6.081366 
-3.506374 
     
   DF-GLS PP DF-GLS PP 
SE 
Level 
Test Statistics -3.095207 -2.446481 -3.406519 -2.697724 
Critical Value -1.947816 -2.922449 -3.190000 -3.504330 
     
First Difference 
Test Statistics -4.239206 -4.241186 -4.265397 -4.174312 
Critical Value -1.947816 -2.923780 -3.190000 -3.506374 
     
   DF-GLS PP DF-GLS PP 
 
RM1 
Level 
Test Statistics 1.452008 -2.103677 -3.097741 -3.329096 
Critical Value -1.947816 -2.922449 -3.190000 -3.504330 
     
 
First Difference 
Test Statistics -6.044374 -9.729477 -6.125275 -10.76761 
Critical Value -1.947816 -2.923780 -3.190000 -3.506374 
     
   DF-GLS PP DF-GLS PP 
 Level 
Test Statistics -1.060992 -2.414029 -1.096859 -2.278941 
Critical Value -1.947665 -2.922449 -3.190000 -3.504330 
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G 
 
 
  
 
 
First Difference 
Test Statistics -4.940952 -5.777500 -6.174363 -6.583126 
Critical Value -1.947816 -2.923780 -3.190000 -3.506374 
     
 
Table 4: Cointegration Rank Test, Trace 
H0 H1 
Trace 
Statistic for 
SA RM1 G  
Trace 
Statistic for 
SS RM1 G  
Trace 
Statistic for 
SE RM1 G  
5% Critical 
Value 
Max-Eigen 
Statistic for 
SA RM1 G  
Max-Eigen 
Statistic for 
SS RM1 G  
Max-Eigen 
Statistic for 
SE RM1 G  
5% Critical 
Value 
r = 0 r>= 1 34.25666 37.64334 49.64899 29.79707 19.92485 24.62384 37.27007 21.13162 
r<= 1 r>= 2 14.33181 13.01950 12.37892 15.49471 14.20523 12.88420 11.63845 14.26460 
r<= 2 r = 3 0.126579 0.135303 0.740468 3.841466 0.126579 0.135303 0.740468 3.841466 
 
Table 5: Cointegration Vector Estimates
# 
Index SA Index SS Index SE 
SA (-1) 1.000000 SS(-1) 1.000000 SE(-1) 1.000000 
RM1(-1) -1.846732
 
(0.42519) 
[-4.34333] 
RM1(-1) -1.071052 
(0.37539) 
[-2.85318] 
RM1(-1) -0.290536 
(0.05954) 
[-4.87971] 
G(-1) -6.372383 
(3.91414) 
[-1.62804] 
G(-1) 0.819136 
(3.31113) 
[0.24739] 
G(-1) 15.76928 
(4.53356) 
[3.47834] 
Trend 0.149088 
(0.03957) 
[3.76750] 
Trend 0.076818 
(0.03466) 
[2.21660] 
Trend N/A
! 
Constant 47.07058 Constant 26.58451 Constant 5.176798 
#
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
!
 Trend term omitted due to insignificant t-value. 
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Table 6: Adjustment Parameter Estimates
#
, in First-Difference Form 
Index SA Index SS Index SE 
D(SA) -0.072484 
(0.05342) 
[-1.35678] 
D(SS) -0.096674 
(0.06564) 
[-1.47269] 
D(SE) 0.063920 
(0.09651) 
[0.66232] 
D(RM1) 0.229219 
(0.06520) 
[3.51585] 
D(RM1) 0.199950 
(0.09443) 
[2.11737] 
D(RM1) 0.004401 
(0.12204) 
[0.03606] 
D(G) -0.006061
 
(0.00300) 
[-2.01702] 
D(G) -0.011613
 
(0.00424) 
[-2.73826] 
D(G) -0.019023
 
(0.00472) 
[-4.02647] 
#
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
 
Table 7: Weak Exogeneity Test 
Index SA Index SS Index SE 
Null Hypothesis Probability Null Hypothesis Probability Null Hypothesis Probability 
AD(RM1)=0 0.004756 AD(RM1)=0 0.141032 AD(RM1)=0 0.963710 
AD(G)=0 0.067917 AD(G)=0 0.036297 AD(G)=0 0.000219 
 
AD(RM1)= AD(G)= 0 0.002283 AD(RM1)= AD(G)= 0 0.005884 AD(RM1)= AD(G)=0 0.000900 
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Table 8: AR Roots Table 
SE RM1 G SS RM1 G SE RM1 G 
Root Modulus Root Modulus Root Modulus 
 1.000000  1.000000  1.000000  1.000000  1.000000  1.000000 
 1.000000  1.000000  1.000000  1.000000  1.000000  1.000000 
-0.720386  0.720386 -0.758911  0.758911 
 0.698962 - 
0.573383i  0.904055 
 0.697857  0.697857  0.748883  0.748883 
 0.698962 + 
0.573383i  0.904055 
 0.491310 - 
0.491968i  0.695283 
 0.247027 - 
0.613076i  0.660972 
 0.472150 - 
0.762448i  0.896801 
 0.491310 + 
0.491968i  0.695283 
 0.247027 + 
0.613076i  0.660972 
 0.472150 + 
0.762448i  0.896801 
 0.221217 - 
0.423306i  0.477625  0.383318  0.383318 
 0.800188 - 
0.203588i  0.825680 
 0.221217 + 
0.423306i  0.477625 
-0.062024 - 
0.284049i  0.290742 
 0.800188 + 
0.203588i  0.825680 
-0.231697  0.231697 
-0.062024 + 
0.284049i  0.290742 
-0.765272 + 
0.293848i  0.819748 
    
-0.765272 - 
0.293848i  0.819748 
    
 0.185016 + 
0.747655i  0.770207 
    
 0.185016 - 
0.747655i  0.770207 
    
-0.337553 - 
0.683677i  0.762467 
    
-0.337553 + 
0.683677i  0.762467 
    
-0.687599 - 
0.217809i  0.721272 
    
-0.687599 + 
0.217809i  0.721272 
    
 0.026807 + 
0.398627i  0.399528 
    
 0.026807 - 
0.398627i  0.399528 
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Table 9: VEC Residual Portmanteau-Test Results 
 SA RM1 G SS RM1 G SE RM1 G 
Lags Adj Q-Stat Prob. Adj Q-Stat Prob. Adj Q-Stat Prob. 
1  2.143021 NA*  1.533656 NA*  1.994289 NA* 
2  3.969156 NA*  3.522704 NA*  4.806668 NA* 
3  12.32914  0.1954  11.88934  0.2196  11.20278 NA* 
4  18.19010  0.4432  14.75836  0.6785  15.08325 NA* 
5  26.00622  0.5183  20.28835  0.8184  18.57498 NA* 
6  28.42546  0.8117  28.10335  0.8235  26.96102  0.0291 
7  34.98103  0.8588  35.76056  0.8360  33.05339  0.1030 
8  37.92752  0.9523  39.26054  0.9341  40.89482  0.1625 
9  42.71421  0.9766  54.24263  0.7762  49.64303  0.1949 
10  44.81750  0.9950  56.66123  0.9075  51.93121  0.4374 
11  50.68443  0.9967  62.24224  0.9397  64.51523  0.3218 
12  59.63923  0.9943  70.18927  0.9395  71.94157  0.3807 
*The test is valid only for lags larger than the VAR lag order. 
 
 
Table 10: VEC Residual Serial Correlation LM-Test Results 
 SA RM1 G SS RM1 G SE RM1 G 
Lags LM-Stat Prob. LM-Stat Prob. LM-Stat Prob. 
1  5.773401  0.7624  9.163336  0.4223  11.37443  0.2509 
2  4.848946  0.8473  5.891404  0.7507  6.852804  0.6524 
3  10.47155  0.3137  9.896143  0.3590  12.22540  0.2009 
4  5.497579  0.7890  2.536193  0.9799  7.729226  0.5616 
5  8.362763  0.4980  5.496419  0.7891  6.116630  0.7282 
6  2.206882  0.9878  7.630463  0.5718  12.14880  0.2051 
7  6.278005  0.7118  9.207733  0.4183  7.197804  0.6165 
8  2.586024  0.9785  2.932020  0.9669  7.060983  0.6308 
9  4.432041  0.8807  14.38240  0.1094  7.796591  0.5548 
10  1.891224  0.9931  2.690286  0.9753  1.877086  0.9933 
11  5.009414  0.8335  4.693430  0.8602  9.111714  0.4270 
12  7.040226  0.6329  6.774796  0.6606  4.859263  0.8464 
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Table 11: VEC Residual Normality-Test Results 
H0: Normal Distribution of Residuals Joint Prob. 
 Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera 
SA RM1 G 0.8899 0.0706 0.2634 
SS RM1 G 0.4319 0.1046 0.1795 
SE RM1 G 0.8295 0.3092 0.6128 
 
Table 12: White’s VEC Residual Heteroskedasticity Test (No Cross Terms) 
H0: Normal Distribution 
of Residuals 
SA RM1 G SS RM1 G SE RM1 G 
Joint-Prob 0.4653 0.8234 0.7628 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: Japan’s Financial Structure Indices Development 
 
SA: Structure Activity, SS: Structure Size, SE: Structure Efficiency 
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Figure 2: Generalized impulse responses for model SA RM1 G  
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Figure 3: Generalized impulse responses for model SS RM1 G 
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Figure 4: Generalized impulse responses for model SE RM1 G  
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Figure 5: Development of real narrow money (RM1) and real fiscal consumption (F) in Japan, in US $ 
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Figure 6: Singapore’s Financial Structure Index Development 
 
 
Figure 7: USA’s Financial Structure Index Development 
 
 
